Notes

1. In other words, Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta was the foundation and arbiter for this doctrine while he was alive, but left no foundation or arbiter to take his place. In contrast, see Ven. Ānanda’s statement in MN 106 to the effect that, after the Buddha’s passing, the Dhamma was the arbiter among the monks.

2. According to the Commentary, this means that they have not awakened to the meaning/goal (attha) of the True Dhamma.

3. See the three miracles discussed in AN 3:61 and DN 11.

4. This “now” appears in the Thai and Sri Lankan editions, but not in the Burmese or PTS editions.

5. One of the Buddha’s teachers prior to his awakening. See MN 36.

6. Reading vicaritabbaṁ with the Thai edition. The other editions have na vivaditabbaṁ, “should not dispute.”

7. These are the 37 bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas. For a full account, see The Wings to Awakening.

8. The discussion that begins with this paragraph provides an explanation for what is meant by the “middle way” in the Buddha’s first sermon. See also the discussion of pleasure and pain in MN 101.

9. Reading añāṇadassanaṁ with the Thai edition. The other editions have ñāṇadassanaṁ, “that is knowledge & vision,” which doesn’t fit into the general message of the text here.

This passage appears to be a response to the claims made by Pūraṇa Kassapa and Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta, who taught two different forms of determinism and who both claimed to have infinite knowledge of the cosmos, a knowledge that included knowledge of the past and future, which in their view was already predetermined (AN 9:38, DN 2). The Buddha, however, rejected determinism (see AN 3:63) and instead taught a doctrine of kamma that allowed for the freedom to choose skillful or unskillful courses of action in the present moment. This meant that his knowledge of the future did not encompass all details about the future, as many of those details were contingent on decisions that had not yet been made. But he did have future knowledge of a more specific and more valuable sort: He knew that he would not be reborn. Regardless of how unlimited Pūraṇa Kassapa and Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta might claim their knowledge of the future to be, they did not have this sort of knowledge of their own future at all.

Nevertheless, even though the Buddha did not claim total knowledge of the future, he was able to see tendencies in the present that would bear future fruit. For example, in SN 20:7 and AN 5:79–80, he foresees the decline of the Saṅgha and the disappearance of the True Dhamma, but he warns the monks of these coming dangers, not so that they would accept them as inevitable, but so that they would do what they could to counteract them. This means that the monks would have it in their power to slow these tendencies down. In MN 12, he illustrates his knowledge of the future fate of specific individuals with the analogy of the one-way path (ekāyana-magga): When a man is following a one-way path to that leads only to one specific destination, one would know that he will eventually reach that destination. In the same way, the Buddha can see of specific individuals that as long as they follow specific one-way paths of practice, their practice will eventually lead them to the corresponding goals. This knowledge, of course, is dependent on each individual’s continuing to follow that path of practice.

10. See MN 58.

11. See Iti 44 and the discussion in The Mind Like Fire Unbound, chapter 1.

12. See AN 4:24 and Iti 112.

13. For a discussion of the Buddha’s reasons for not answering these questions, see Skill in Questions, chapter 8.

14. The refrains that frame the following discussion on view-dependencies contain many variant readings, and unfortunately none of the printed editions sorts out the variants especially well. The Commentary is of no help in this regard, as it addresses itself only to some of the more obvious issues in the discussion, and leaves the less obvious ones untouched. Therefore, this translation is tentative, based on the readings that seem best to me, based both on stylistic grounds and on the way they fit in with the discussions of these views in other suttas.

The term diṭṭhi-nissaya, “view dependency,” is also found in Ud 6:5.

15. Of the view-dependencies in the following list, the question of whether the self and the world are eternal is treated in DN 1, DN 28, and MN 102, and is mentioned in Ud 6:5; the question of whether the self is self-made, etc., is mentioned in Ud 6:5, as is the question of whether pleasure & pain are eternal; the question of whether pleasure & pain are self-made, etc., is treated in SN 12:18 and SN 12:25, and mentioned in AN 6:95.

The suttas that treat these views, as opposed to those that merely mention them, show how the Buddha would and would not declare them. In all cases, he would not declare them as, “Only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless.” He would declare or explain them, however, in the sense of showing either how the view is formulated, how it is grasped, or how grasping to the view gets in the way of reaching the deathless. The discussion in DN 1 is the most complex, as it gives a detailed and different treatment for each of the views it covers. However, DN 1 contains a refrain that treats every view it covers in light of dependent co-arising. This refrain—along with passages from MN 102 and SN 12:25—gives the general thrust of the way in which the Buddha would explain/declare these views.

“When those contemplatives & brahmans assert various types of theories… on 62 grounds, that is an agitation & vacillation to be felt by those contemplatives & brahmans who, not knowing, not seeing, are immersed in craving.… That comes from contact as a requisite condition.… That they would experience that other than through contact: That isn’t possible.… They all experience that through repeated contact at the six sense media. For them, from feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance. From clinging/sustenance as a requisite condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. From birth as a requisite condition, then aging-&-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair come into play. Such is the origination of this entire mass of stress & suffering.

“But when a monk discerns the origination, ending, allure, drawbacks of, & escape from the six sense media, he discerns what is higher than all of this.” — DN 1

“Those contemplatives & brahmans who are of this view, this opinion, ‘The self & the cosmos are eternal: Only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless’: It is impossible that—apart from conviction, apart from liking, apart from unbroken tradition, apart from reasoning by analogy, apart from an agreement through pondering views [see MN 95 and AN 3:66]—they would have their very own pure & clear personal knowledge of that. There being no pure & clear personal knowledge, whatever modicum or sliver of knowledge those venerable contemplatives & brahmans clarify on that matter is said to be clinging on their part. With regard to that—fabricated, gross—there is still the cessation of fabrications: There is this.’ Knowing that, seeing the escape from it, the Tathāgata has gone beyond it.” — MN 102

“Whatever contemplatives & brahmans, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are self-made, even that is dependent on contact. Whatever contemplatives & brahmans, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are other-made… self-made & other-made… without self-making or other-making, are spontaneously arisen, even that is dependent on contact.

“It isn’t possible that any contemplatives & brahmans—teachers of kamma who declare that pleasure & pain are self-made—would be sensitive to pleasure & pain otherwise than through contact. It isn’t possible that any contemplatives & brahmans—teachers of kamma who declare that pleasure & pain are other-made… self-made & other-made… without self-making or other-making, are spontaneously arisen —would be sensitive to pleasure & pain otherwise than through contact.

“When there is a body, pleasure & pain arise internally with bodily intention as the cause; or when there is speech, pleasure & pain arise internally with verbal intention as the cause; or when there is intellect, pleasure & pain arise internally with intellectual intention as the cause.

“From ignorance as a requisite condition, then either of one’s own accord one fabricates the bodily fabrication on account of which that pleasure & pain arise internally, or because of others one fabricates the bodily fabrication on account of which that pleasure & pain arise internally. Either one fabricates alert the bodily fabrication on account of which that pleasure & pain arise internally; or one fabricates unalert the bodily fabrication on account of which that pleasure & pain arise internally. [Similarly with verbal & intellectual fabrications.]

“Now, ignorance is bound up in these things. From the remainderless fading & cessation of that very ignorance, there no longer exists (the sense of) the body on account of which that pleasure & pain internally arise. There no longer exists the speech… the intellect on account of which that pleasure & pain internally arise. There no longer exists the field, the site, the dimension, or the issue on account of which that pleasure & pain internally arise.” — SN 12:25

16. As the discussions of these points in DN 1 and DN 28 make clear, there are beings who, even though they can remember past lives, have different memories/perceptions of those lives because of the vagaries of their kamma and the limitations on their memories. Thus they come to different conclusions about where they ultimately came from—and, as is shown in the following section of this sutta, what will become of them after death. The Buddha’s larger knowledge of past lives shows that none of the view-dependencies offered here can be the only truth about the past or the future. And some of them are simply not true: As he says in SN 12:18, it is definitely not true that pleasure & pain are spontaneously arisen; instead, they are dependently co-arisen. And as for beginning points in general, SN 15:3 states that transmigration comes from an inconceivable beginning point; AN 10:61 says that a beginning point for ignorance, such that one might say, “Before this, ignorance did not exist; then it came into play,” cannot be discerned.

Instead of basing his teachings on perceptions about the past, the Buddha focuses instead on how suffering is maintained—and can be ended—in the immediate present. His formulation of the four noble truths holds true, and is immediately applicable to the problem of suffering and stress here and now, regardless of what one remembers from the past. These truths also serve the purpose of leading to nibbāna, something that none of these other views can do. This is why his criticism of the other views does not apply to right view, and why his doctrine is superior to any of the view-dependencies discussed here.

17. The view-dependencies in the following list, or close variants, are discussed in DN 1 and MN 102. The first four are discussed in SN 24. The discussions in both DN 1 and MN 102 are quite extended, giving different details for each view, although the refrain in DN 1 is the same here as it is for the view-dependencies dealing with beginning points. A passage from SN 24:37 gives an idea of how it and its companion suttas declare/explain the first four of these views:

“Monks, there being what, clinging to what, entrenched in what, does this view arise: ‘After death, the self is possessed of form & free from disease’?” …

“There being form, clinging to form, entrenched in form, this view arises: ‘After death, the self is possessed of form & free from disease.’ There being feeling… There being perception… There being fabrications… There being consciousness, clinging to consciousness, entrenched in consciousness, this view arises: ‘After death, the self is possessed of form & free from disease.’

“Now what do you think, monks? Is form constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, lord.”

“And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?”

“Stressful, lord.”

“And without clinging to what is inconstant, stressful, and subject to change, would this view arise: ‘After death, the self is possessed of form & free from disease’?”

“No, lord.”

“Thus it is that—there being stress, clinging to stress, entrenched in stress—this view arises, ‘After death, the self is possessed of form & free from disease.’”

[Similarly with the remaining aggregates.]

“Now what do you think, monks? Is what is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought after, pondered by the intellect constant or inconstant?”

“Inconstant, lord.”

“And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?”

“Stressful, lord.”

“And without clinging to what is inconstant, stressful, and subject to change, would this view arise: ‘After death, the self is possessed of form & free from disease’?”

“No, lord.”

“Now, when a disciple of the noble ones has abandoned doubt with regard to these six bases [the five aggregates and what is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought after, pondered by the intellect], and has abandoned doubt with regard to stress, has abandoned doubt with regard to the origination of stress, has abandoned doubt with regard to the cessation of stress, and has abandoned doubt with regard to the way of practice leading to the cessation of stress, then he is a stream-enterer, certain, never again destined for the lower realms, headed for self-awakening.”

In addition, MN 2 makes clear that the Buddha would avoid answering the question of whether there is a self to begin with.

18. See DN 22 and MN 118. See also, Right Mindfulness.

19. See SN 46:8 and DN 16.

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